Saturday, January 10, 2009
independent count now available in CSV form
I've just uploaded contest-by-contest CSV files (Comma Separated Variables -- it's a spreadsheet thing) for many of Humboldt County's November 2008 contests. They are at http://www.mitchtrachtenberg.com/Nov2008. The files are based on the output from Ballot Browser operating on scans done by the volunteers of the Humboldt County Election Transparency Project and are as unofficial as anything can be. The file format is explained at the link.
Thursday, January 8, 2009
update on Humboldt's Nov 2008 results
Joint Statement on the November 2008 Humboldt County Election Results
Carolyn Crnich,
Humboldt County Clerk and Registrar of Voters
Mitch Trachtenberg,
Humboldt County Election Transparency Project volunteer
January 8, 2009
As we've compared the results from Humboldt County's official count with the independent count Mitch has conducted with his Ballot Browser independent vote counting software, we've found two additional issues.
First, the Election Transparency Project had scanned the front side of 63 ballots twice (once upside down); these duplicate scans will be removed from Ballot Browser's counts.
Second, the Elections office appears to have scanned 57 ballots into the Diebold GEMS system twice -- these duplicates need to be removed from the GEMS results.
The numbers from the two systems are now extremely close, though not identical.
We believe many of the remaining variations may be a result of differing vote sensitivity between the Diebold system and Ballot Browser, with Ballot Browser's totals approximately 0.05% higher than those from the Diebold system (approximately one added vote per 2,000 counted vote opportunities).
The variations that remain do not affect the outcome of any races.
Carolyn Crnich,
Humboldt County Clerk and Registrar of Voters
Mitch Trachtenberg,
Humboldt County Election Transparency Project volunteer
January 8, 2009
As we've compared the results from Humboldt County's official count with the independent count Mitch has conducted with his Ballot Browser independent vote counting software, we've found two additional issues.
First, the Election Transparency Project had scanned the front side of 63 ballots twice (once upside down); these duplicate scans will be removed from Ballot Browser's counts.
Second, the Elections office appears to have scanned 57 ballots into the Diebold GEMS system twice -- these duplicates need to be removed from the GEMS results.
The numbers from the two systems are now extremely close, though not identical.
We believe many of the remaining variations may be a result of differing vote sensitivity between the Diebold system and Ballot Browser, with Ballot Browser's totals approximately 0.05% higher than those from the Diebold system (approximately one added vote per 2,000 counted vote opportunities).
The variations that remain do not affect the outcome of any races.
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